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MULTICULTURALISM VERSUS ANTIDISCRIMINATION
Christian Joppke*
Contemporary immigration has reinforced calls for minority rights in liberal states, which 
accrue to immigrants (but also to citizens) qua member of an ethnic minority group.  It is often 
overlooked that such minority rights may be of two kinds: multicultural rights that protect 
cultural differences or antidiscrimination rights that attack discrimination on these grounds.  I 
argue that the importance of multicultural rights has been greatly exaggerated, and that much 
of the work attributed to them has in fact been accomplished by group-indifferent individual 
rights.  By contrast, antidiscrimination rights are growing stronger, even in Europe.  However, 
to the degree that it tackles indirect discrimination, antidiscrimination cannot but be factually 
group-making, even in states that reject multiculturalism.
INTRODUCTION
By bearing or adhering to a distinct ethnicity, race, or religion, immigrants often 
constitute a minority group in the society into which they move.  A classic text by 
Chicago sociologist Louis Wirth defined a minority group as “a group of people who, 
because of their physical or cultural characteristics, are singled out from the others in 
the society in which they live for differential and unequal treatment, and who therefore 
regard themselves as objects of collective discrimination.”1  Wirth’s definition aptly 
captures the role of discrimination and inequality in the making of a minority.  In this 
view, a minority only arises out of the discrimination inflicted on it by the majority. 
Extrapolating from Wirth, one may conceive of minority rights as protections from 
physical or cultural discrimination.
By the same token, Wirth2 may overstate the other-defined, discriminatory origins 
of minority groups.  For instance, Mary Waters found that the ethnic identifications 
today of Americans of European origin are entirely self-made and optional, and she 
distinguishes their “symbolic ethnicity” sharply from the “real and often hurtful” 
* Professor of Politics, The American University of Paris.
1 Louis Wirth, The Problem of Minority Groups, in THE SCIENCE OF MAN IN THE WORLD CRISIS 347, 
347 (Ralph Linton ed., 1940).
2 Id.
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consequences of “being Asian or Hispanic or black.”3  Of course, one may refrain 
from calling self-defined Italian or Polish-Americans a “minority group,” as Waters 
does herself; she prefers to call them an “ethnic group” instead.4  But it would be 
unhelpful to make the modicum of self-definition that even in Wirth’s5 account is 
required for being a minority solely a function of external discrimination.  Witness 
the recent re-labeling of American blacks into “African-Americans,” which shows 
the need for positive self-definition even among a group that would not exist except 
for the gross discrimination that is slavery.  There is likely to be a continuum between 
positive self-definition and negative other-definition in the making of a minority, and 
it is implausible to eradicate from it a positive sense of collective self that is not 
reducible to discrimination but that articulates a shared ethnicity, language, religion, 
or history.
The distinction between positive self-definition and negative other-definition in 
the making of a minority is not just academic.  It points to a fundamental ambiguity 
of how the state should respond or relate to the minority: Should it be protected or 
should it be abolished in the name of equality?  This alternative is often slighted, 
perhaps because immigrants themselves often slight it.  In her valuable study of 
how immigrants “negotiate identities” in France and Germany, Riva Kastoryano, for 
instance, claims that immigrants struggle “against every form of exclusion … which 
ends in a demand for recognition.”6  This may well be, but there still is a distinction 
between both types of politics and concomitant state response, inclusion undoing the 
group qua group and recognition perpetuating it.  In this Article, I refer to the first 
response as “antidiscrimination” and to the second as “multiculturalism,” and I map 
out the rather different logics of both.  However, even notionally group-destroying 
antidiscrimination cannot but be factually group-making, so that a modicum of de 
facto multiculturalism will persist even where there has been a philosophical rejection 
of it.
3 MARY WATERS, ETHNIC OPTIONS: CHOOSING IDENTITIES IN AMERICA 156 (1990).
4 Id. at 157.  Mary Waters’s distinction between ethnic and racial groups, the former being 
positively self- and the latter negatively other-defined, echoes Max Weber’s famous discussion on 
“ethnic relations” (ethnische Gemeinschaftsbeziehungen) in his WIRTSCHAFT UND GESELLSCHAFT: 
GRUNDRISS DER VERSTEHENDEN SOZIOLOGIE 234-244 (1976).
5 Wirth, supra note 1.
6 RIVA KASTORYANO, NEGOTIATING IDENTITIES: STATES AND IMMIGRANTS IN FRANCE AND GERMANY 140 
(Barbara Harshav trans., Princeton University Press, 2002).
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I. MULTICULTURALISM
In the post-WWII era, Western states abstained from forcing immigrants to abandon 
their culture of origin as a price for admission.  The mantra was “integration not 
assimilation,” which left the cultural integrity of immigrants intact.  The only question 
was whether such integration could be achieved within the established rules of 
private and public, or whether the line dividing both spheres had to be redrawn. More 
concretely, were immigrants free to follow their cultural ways in private and had the 
state to stay neutral on such matters or was a further, proactive stance on part of the state 
required to reshuffle the existing private-public distinction?  Multiculturalism proper 
is the second response, according to which the state should not stay aloof but publicly 
recognize the minority group.  To a certain degree, even international law has moved 
in this direction.  One of the first post-WWII codifications of minority rights, the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, only asked states to refrain from 
certain actions, namely that minorities “shall not be denied the right” to their culture, 
religion, or language.7  The 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to 
National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities contains stronger and more 
proactive language that states shall “protect” and “promote” these minorities.8  This 
may mean little change in reality,9 but the distinctly more multicultural diction in the 
1992 declaration is unmistakable.
What marks multiculturalism as a political stance has been influentially formulated 
by Charles Taylor.10  Multiculturalism is depicted as expression of the “modern 
preoccupation with identity and recognition,” which derives from modernity’s collapse 
of social hierarchies and a new ideal of authenticity.11  The novelty is not the quest 
for identity and recognition, which is grounded in the “dialogical” nature of human 
life. What is new is that this quest can fail, because identity is no longer immutably 
fixed by one’s social position.12  Under modern conditions, recognition engenders two 
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
8 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic 
Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, art. 1, annex, 47 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49 at 210, U.N. Doc. A/47/49 
(Dec. 18, 1992) states: “States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious 
and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions 
for the promotion of that identity.”
9 See the critique by WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS (2007).
10 CHARLES TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM AND “THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION” (1992).
11 Id. at 26.
12 Id. at 35.
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different kinds of politics: a “politics of universalism” that strives for the equal dignity 
of all individuals and “politics of difference” that asks to recognize the unique identity 
of this individual or group.  Both politics are internally connected, as “[t]he universal 
demand powers an acknowledgment of specificity.”13  However, and this is the rub, the 
politics of difference operates as a polemic against the politics of universalism, which 
is accused of being a “particularism masquerading as the universal” and of “imposing 
a false homogeneity.”14  While such a stance can be found in radical feminism, Taylor 
traces it to Frantz Fanon’s indigenous critique of colonialism.  Much like Fanon’s 
The Damned of the Earth, multiculturalism attacks “the imposition of some cultures 
on others, and … the assumed superiority that powers this imposition.”15  Positively 
phrased, multiculturalism, at least in the Taylorian variant, asks for the “presumption” 
of “equal worth” of the cultures denigrated by the West.16
Of course, this is only a variant of multiculturalism and one in which it is a radical 
alternative to, and critique of, liberalism.17  In addition, there is a liberal variant, in 
which multicultural minority rights complement rather than substitute liberal rights 
and citizenship.18  But constitutive for all variants is that minority identities have to 
be publicly recognized in a kind of special deal apart from the general rule of law, 
which does not know group distinctions.  Even in Kymlicka’s liberal variant, “benign 
neglect,” the classical liberal state stance on religion does not work with respect to 
culture.19  Try as it might, the liberal state can never be neutral in the choice of its 
public language, holidays, and symbols, which inevitably privileges the majority 
group.  If equal justice is to prevail, the culture of minority groups needs special 
protection by the state.
To have one’s identity recognized by the state has always been an implausible 
stance, not only with respect to immigrants.  As Chandran Kukathas retorted to Taylor 
and Kymlicka alike, “recognition” is not something the liberal state can deliver: 
The liberal state … should take no interest in the character or identity 
of individuals; nor should it be concerned directly to promote 
human flourishing: it should have no collective projects; it should 
13 Id. at 39.
14 Id. at 44.
15 Id. at 63.
16 Id. at 68.
17 For another influential radical variant, which is inspired not by anticolonialism but by feminism, 
see IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990).
18 WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); 
see also Christian Joppke, Multicultural Citizenship: A Critique, 42 EUR. J. SOC. 431 (2001).
19 KYMLICKA, supra note 18, at 108-15.
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express no group preferences; and it should promote no particular 
individuals or individual interests.  Its only concern ought to be 
with upholding the framework of law within which individuals and 
groups can function peacefully.20  
Liberalism, Kukathas sums it up, should be at heart a “politics of indifference.”21
What Kukathas formulated as an “ought to” captures well the factual uneasiness 
that has always surrounded liberal state responses to multicultural claims.  By definition 
an asymmetrical stance, recognition, in singling out one group, must whet the appetite 
of other putative groups to be recognized as well.  Recognition, thus, not only vitiates 
the symmetry of the rule of law but is “almost always dangerous” in the real world, 
as Kukathas argues with an eye on the rougher quarters of South East Asia.22  In fact, 
groups are often only called into existence by the recognition game itself.  And this is 
a game that helps transform mundane interests, which are open to compromise, into 
ethereal identities that are not.
While an unlikely stance to take in the liberal state at large, recognition becomes 
especially implausible if applied to immigrants.  Kymlicka actually admits this in his 
pragmatic concession that immigrants, by voluntarily leaving their homeland, have 
“waived” the right to have their culture and identity resurrected abroad.23  The “polyethnic” 
rights that are granted to immigrants, such as exemptions from general laws that unduly 
restrict their cultural or religious ways or public funding for their cultural practices, are 
intended to promote “integration into the larger society, not self-government.”24  Only, 
in this healthily minimalist account it is not clear why such measures are couched in the 
language of rights; perhaps they are better conceived of as pragmatic concessions by 
means of which states seek to further the integration of immigrants.
The rights worthy of the name “rights” with respect to accommodating immigrants 
as cultural minorities are not special “polyethnic” rights, granted only to them and 
not to others.  Instead, the most effective protections are the general rights of free 
expression and association, of privacy and family life, and of religious belief and 
practice that the liberal state grants to all individuals, immigrants and natives, residents 
and citizens.25  For instance, much of Muslims’ accommodation in liberal societies 
20 CHANDRAN KUKATHAS, LIBERAL ARCHIPELAGO: A THEORY OF DIVERSITY AND FREEDOM 249 (2003).
21 Id. at 250.
22 Id. at 251.
23 KYMLICKA, supra note 18, at 86-87. 
24 Id. at 31.
25 One of the few rights with a cultural inflection, which are available to immigrant minorities 
but not to members of the majority group, is the so-called “cultural defense” in criminal law, which 
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has proceeded along this individual rights track.  This has regularly brought courts, 
as the defenders of individual rights, into conflict with rights-constricting public 
authorities, with courts and their minority clients getting the upper-hand most of the 
time.  Especially in continental Europe, with entrenched systems of judicial review 
and written constitutions, courts have routinely consented to Muslim parents’ wishes 
to exempt their daughters from parts of the school curriculum that are considered in 
violation of their religious beliefs; allowed exemptions from animal protection laws 
that stand in the way of a religious diet; or forced public and private employers to 
accommodate the ritual needs of their Muslim employees.26
A particular case in point is the accommodation of the Muslim veil.27  If wearing 
it is allowed, even for state agents who are expected to be neutral in their appearance, 
this is because the right of free religious expression is deemed superior to the rights 
of other involved parties or public order concerns.  By the same token, if the veil is 
prohibited, as it has been for public school students under the French anti-veiling law 
of 2004 and for public school teachers in several regional anti-veiling laws in Germany 
in 2004 and 2005, this is because third-party rights or public order considerations have 
won the upper hand.28  Overall, the highly publicized headscarf restrictions, all passed 
in the turmoil after 2001 and the global proliferation of Islamic terror, obscure the 
silent accommodation of most Muslim claims (including the claim to wear the veil) 
by the legal systems of Western states.  The individual rights provisions of the liberal 
state have done much of the work that multiculturalists have wrongly charged their 
grander “recognition” campaigns with, only more quietly and effectively.
II. ANTIDISCRIMINATION
Whereas the thrust of multiculturalism is particularistic, seeking to perpetuate minority 
groups, the opposite thrust of antidiscrimination is universalistic, seeking to render 
minority groups invisible and in this sense to destroy them.  The great ancestor of all 
contemporary antidiscrimination policies are the American civil rights laws, passed 
reduces the culpability of offenders who are deemed conditioned by their origin cultures (see ALISON 
DUNDES RENTELN, THE CULTURAL DEFENSE (2005).
26 See Christian Joppke, Successes and Failures of Muslim Integration in France and Germany, 
in  BRINGING OUTSIDERS IN: TRANSATLANTIC PERSPECTIVES ON IMMIGRANT POLITICAL INCORPORATION 115, 
120-125 (Jennifer L. Hochschild & John H. Mollenkopf eds., 2009).
27 See, e.g., in this issue, Gila Stopler, Rights in Immigration: The Veil as a Test Case, 43 ISR. L. 
REV. 183 (2010).
28 See CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, VEIL: MIRROR OF IDENTITY (2009).
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in the early to mid-1960s in order to end the racial segregation of American blacks. 
Their target is not “expressive racism,” such as defamation or assault, but “access 
racism,”29 which denies minorities equal participation in key societal sectors such 
as employment, education, and housing.  If multiculturalism is situated in the lofty 
realm of culture and identity, antidiscrimination moves us into the mundane world of 
interest conflict over scarce resources.
It is safe to say that in the wake of post-WWII immigration, antidiscrimination laws 
and policies have massively increased throughout the Western world.  Of particular 
significance is its development in the U.S., where a policy that had originally been 
conceived as a color-blind measure to combat discrimination against “any individual” 
on the basis of their “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”30 quickly turned 
into color-conscious affirmative action, in which specific, historically disadvantaged 
groups are selected for preferential access to important societal resources, most notably 
employment, business contracts, and higher education.  U.S. antidiscrimination 
policies, thus, transformed from a notionally group-destroying into a factually group-
making measure, no longer content with securing “equal opportunity” but rather 
aiming at “equal results” by means of quota and strict time-tables.31
While this transformation was accomplished by an obvious change of philosophy, 
it was still more the product of accident than of design.  As the historian Hugh Davis 
Graham showed, the change from color-blindness to color-consciousness stemmed 
from the difficulties that federal agencies faced in effectively implementing the 
civil rights laws: “The problems and politics of implementation produced a shift 
of administrative and judicial enforcement from a goal of equal treatment to one 
of equal results.”32  It was much easier to identify discrimination by its (presumed) 
result than by its motivation.  The watershed in this shift was in 1971 in the Supreme 
Court ruling of Griggs v. Duke Power Company that invalidated hiring practices 
and intra-company promotion schemes that were “fair in form, but discriminatory 
in operation.”33  Thus, the notion of indirect discrimination was born.  It did not 
29 I borrow the useful distinction between “expressive” and “access” racism from ERIK BLEICH, 
RACE POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND FRANCE: IDEAS AND POLICYMAKING SINCE THE 1960S 12-13 (2003).
30 Civil Rights Act of 1964 title VII, sec. 701(b), July 2, 1964, 78 Stat. 241, which targets 
“unlawful employment practices.”
31 Still best on the distinction between equality of opportunity and equality of results is DANIEL 
BELL, THE COMING OF POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 408-455 (1973).
32 HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY, 
1960–1972, 456 (1990).  See also JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE IRONIES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (1996), 
who similarly grounds the rise of affirmative action in “administrative pragmatism.”
33 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
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require identifying a discriminatory intention on the part of the employer; instead, 
the statistical under-representation of the discriminated group in the workforce was 
sufficient.  Of course, such statistical discrimination, which happens whenever there 
is a “disproportionate” negative impact of a facially neutral measure on a minority 
group, is still attributed to originally overt discrimination.  As the U.S. Supreme Court 
stated in Griggs, employment practices with such impact “operate to ‘freeze’ the status 
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”34  This is a rather daring leap of 
faith because zoomed out are innumerous other factors that might cause the statistical 
under-representation of a minority group.
But the crucial matter in Griggs’s invention, not of the name but of the concept 
of indirect discrimination,35 is “abolishing the analytical distinction between 
antidiscrimination and affirmative action.”36  Remember that antidiscrimination, 
being color-blind, cuts both ways, prohibiting discrimination against whites as well. 
Affirmative action necessarily discriminates against whites (which is dubbed “reverse 
discrimination”).  Prohibiting indirect discrimination erases the distinction between 
antidiscrimination and affirmative action, in that antidiscrimination now “requires 
selection of a limited number of reference groups within which all individuals will 
enjoy a specific kind of protection not available to members of other conceivable 
groups.”37  There can be no statistical under-representation without a preformed sense 
of the “groups” that are subject to this.  And these groups are precisely those that 
once were targeted for overt, intentional discrimination.  In a nutshell, there cannot 
be a fight against indirect discrimination that is not group-making or at least group-
reinforcing.
The impetus of the transformation from antidiscrimination into affirmative action, 
much as of the original civil rights laws, was to help out the original victims and 
today’s most disadvantaged members of American society, the descendants of African-
American slaves.  However, affirmative action was immediately extended to other 
historically disadvantaged groups: American Indians, Hispanics, and Asians (as well 
as women, not further considered here).  The logic of this extension has never quite 
been unveiled.  In John David Skrentny’s stellar account of the American “minority 
rights revolution,” it is not the pressure of social movements but the “anticipatory 
34 Id. at 430.
35 The words “indirect discrimination” do not appear in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., id.
36 DANIEL SABBAGH, EQUALITY AND TRANSPARENCY: A STRATEGIC PERSPECTIVE ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 
IN AMERICAN LAW 123 (2007).
37 Id.
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politics” by enlightened state administrators that is responsible for this extension.38 
Administrators included groups “analogous to blacks,” following a mostly implicit 
“logic of appropriateness” not unlike that of “bugs are not food.”39  All non-black 
groups “were all basically free rides, requiring virtually no lobbying or protest at 
all.”40  And if white ethnics, such as the working-class descendants of Polish or Italian 
immigrants who had heavily lobbied for inclusion in affirmative action between 
1965 and 1975, were shown the door, this is because “they simply had not suffered 
enough.”41
Regardless of the logic of carving out and delimiting the American affirmative 
action universe, immigrants who matched one of the protected groups were in it from 
the start.42  This is because constitutional and statutory rights protections, including 
those provided by the 1964 Civil Rights Act and its creative reinterpretation by the civil 
rights bureaucracy, have always targeted “persons,” not just “citizens.”  This meant 
that seventy percent of the 20 million immigrants entering America between 1965 
and 1995 immediately profited from affirmative action.43 This is because, after the 
de-racialization of U.S. immigration law in 1965, most newcomers would come from 
Latin America and Asia. They thus filled the “Hispanic” and “Asian” racial categories 
that are entitled to affirmative action, even though these newcomers themselves could 
not point to a history of injustice at the hands of white America. 
However, the justification of affirmative action underwent a momentous shift in 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s Bakke decision of 1978.44  The famous swing opinion by 
Justice Powell, which tilted an evenly divided Supreme Court to support a qualified 
version of affirmative action, radically departed from the previous paradigm of 
corrective justice for minorities.  As Powell pointed out, the “white ‘majority’ itself 
is composed of various minority groups, most of which can lay claim to a history 
of prior discrimination.”45  If anything, the U.S. was a “[n]ation of minorities”, 
each having had “to struggle—and to some extent [struggling] still—to overcome 
the prejudices not of a monolithic majority, but of a ‘majority’ composed of various 
38 JOHN DAVID SKRENTNY, THE MINORITY RIGHTS REVOLUTION (2002).
39 Id. at 9-12.
40 Id. at 141.
41 Id. at 264.
42 See HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, COLLISION COURSE : THE STRANGE CONVERGENCE OF AFFIRMATIVE 
ACTION AND IMMIGRATION POLICY IN AMERICA (2002).
43 SABBAGH, supra note 36, at 39.
44 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
45 Id. at 295.
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minority groups.”46  If everyone was a minority, there was no longer any basis for 
preferential treatment. The only way in which “race” could be salvaged as a positive 
factor in college admissions was as a “plus” that helped universities build a “diverse 
student body” that was conducive to its educational mission of fostering a “robust 
exchange of ideas.”47 Thus, “diversity” was born, which has since become the main 
justification of affirmative action.
The new diversity paradigm had several advantages.  As Justice Powell outlined in 
Bakke, it dispensed with “the kind of variable sociological and political analysis” that 
was required for determining who was “minority” or “majority” at any point in time, 
which was beyond the scope of “judicial competence” and better accomplished by 
Congress.48  Diversity was, as Daniel Sabbagh sharply observed, a device for keeping 
race and antidiscrimination in the legal—as opposed to the political—arena.  But, in 
addition to this strategic advantage, there were other, more substantive advantages.49 
Most importantly, only in the diversity paradigm did the inclusion of immigrants in 
affirmative action not constitute an anomaly.50  Moreover,  diversity legitimized the 
inherent tendency of affirmative action, fed by the apparatus engendered by it, to be 
in for the long haul, as now there was no need to identify the (necessary if impossible) 
moment when the last trace of past injustice would have been eradicated.
Finally, diversity provided the “missing link” between antidiscrimination and 
multiculturalism.51  It had always been more than a coincidence that affirmative action 
had evolved side-by-side with multiculturalism, which in the U.S. is institutionalized 
above all in “minoritized” public-school and college curricula, and in a plethora of 
women’s and ethnic and racial studies programs at the country’s universities, especially 
the better ones.  Through Sabbagh’s rather dark lens, American multiculturalism—
with its penchant for fostering “self-esteem” through ethno-racial perspectivism—is 
a “rationalization of the failure” that many an affirmative action students experienced 
at the elite university into which she or he was admitted.52  This is most certainly 
exaggerated.53  However, diversity’s foot in both camps is evident in Justice Powell’s 
46 Id. at 292.
47 Id. at 311 and 313, respectively.
48 Id. at 297.
49 SABBAGH, supra note 36, at 38.
50 Id. at 43.
51 Id. at 163.
52 Id. at 156.
53 See Mary Waters & Zoua M. Vang, The Challenges of Immigration to Race-Based Diversity 
Policies in the United States, in 3 BELONGING? DIVERSITY, RECOGNITION AND SHARED CITIZENSHIP IN 
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strange inference from race to a viewpoint and the ensuing equation of race with 
culture, which is a staple of multicultural discourse.  To the degree that Bakke helped 
boost the multicultural notion of viewpoint diversity, American multiculturalism 
is indeed “partly a side effect of the juridicialization of political conflicts over the 
reduction of race-based inequality.”54
Let us turn to Europe, in which antidiscrimination has never had similarly strong 
grounding in the domestic race issue.  In Europe there is no legacy of domestic slavery 
and Jim Crow racism, which might have whipped European states onto the road of 
result-oriented racial equality.  In fact, the command never, never to morph into 
affirmative action has from the start accompanied the first European antidiscrimination 
policy, which is the one of Britain.55  While European antidiscrimination policies 
mostly concern immigrants and their descendents, it is still noteworthy that their 
earliest incarnations all occurred in societies where immigrants, through colonial 
linkages, either arrived as citizens or were able to acquire citizenship easily.  Only if 
there is a sense that racial discrimination happens “within the political community,” 
which again is conditional on “open citizenship laws,”56 is there a likely push toward 
antidiscrimination.  Accordingly, Germany—until recently a country with closed 
citizenship laws that kept immigrants and their descendents out of the political 
community—moved toward antidiscrimination only belatedly. In fact, Germany 
adopted an antidiscrimination law only due to external pressure by European Union 
law. How contested this move was, one may see in the fact that an otherwise moderate 
mind denounced it as “legal vandalism.”57
Only in European states with a colonial legacy and historically open citizenship 
laws does antidiscrimination have domestic roots. In all other European states, 
antidiscrimination took hold only after the EU Race Directive was passed in 2000, 
which imposes the Anglo-Saxon type of civil-law based fight against “access 
racism” also on countries that had previously proceeded differently on the matter 
CANADA 433 (Keith Banting, Thomas J. Courchene & F. Leslie Seidle eds., 2007), who cite evidence 
that by means of affirmative action minorities have made “remarkable strides in education, particularly 
post-secondary education.”
54 SABBAGH, supra note 36, at 162.
55 Steven M. Teles, Why is There No Affirmative Action in Britain? 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 1004 
(1998).
56 Jacqueline S. Gehring, Hidden Connections: Citizenship and Anti-Discrimination Policy in 
Europe, in CITIZENSHIP POLICIES IN THE AGE OF DIVERSITY: EUROPE AT THE CROSSROADS (Ricard Zapata-
Barrero ed., 2009).
57 Karl-Heinz Ladeur, The German Proposal for an ‘Anti-Discrimination’- law: Anticonstitutional 
and Anti-Common Sense. A Response to Nicola Vennemann, 3 GER. L.J. 1 (2002).
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of discrimination,58 if at all.  The EU Race Directive requires member states to pass 
legislation that outlaws “direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin” within a narrow time frame.59  Its scope is sweeping, including employment, 
education, social protection, health care, and access to vital private goods and services 
such as housing and insurance.  As with the British antidiscrimination law on which 
the European law is modeled, the burden of proof is on the accused party to rebut 
“presumed” discrimination, and member states are obliged to create “a body or bodies 
for the promotion of equal treatment.”60
The most important feature of the EU-led fight against discrimination is its inclusion 
of indirect discrimination.61  This raises the question whether Europe is destined to 
go down the American road of latently group-making antidiscrimination policies. 
Interestingly, the EU Race Directive is at best permissive about the next logical step 
to tackling indirect discrimination, namely “positive action,” which member states are 
“not prevent(ed)” from taking but also not mandated to do.62  France, with its long-
standing, Republican aversion to recognizing groups that stand in between the citizen 
and the state, deems itself immune to the virus of group recognition that is inherent in 
the principle of indirect discrimination.  This is because of a clause inserted at France’s 
behest in the Race Directive, which leaves “(t)he appreciation of the facts” about 
direct or indirect discrimination “a matter for national judicial or other competent 
bodies, in accordance with rules of national law or practice.”63  In short, France does 
acknowledge the existence of indirect discrimination but is not forced to collect the 
requisite statistical evidence to corroborate this fact.64  But if one considers the EU 
campaign to “promote diversity,”65 which has accompanied the European foray into 
antidiscrimination, there is no doubt that the latter cannot but be eventually group-
58 Especially France, which earlier used the penal law to combat “expressive” racism (see BLEICH, 
supra note 29, at chs. 5 & 6).  Why France would strongly support a measure foreign to its legal 
tradition is persuasively explained by Virginie Guiraudon, Construire une Politique Européenne de 
Lutte contre les Discriminations: L’Histoire de la Directive Race, 53 SOCIÉTÉS CONTEMPORAINES 11 
(2004).
59 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of June 29, 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
between persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (2000 O.J. 22-26).
60 Id. at art. 13.
61 Id. at art. 2.2(b).
62 Id. at art. 5.
63 Id. at preamble, “whereas.”
64 See Christian Joppke, Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and 
Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany, 59 WORLD POL. 243, 262 (2007).
65 European Commission, Promoting Diversity.  DG4 Employment and Social Affairs 2002.
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recognizing.  This is simply inherent in the notion of diversity that has branched out 
from North America to Europe.  
The so-called Veil Committee (chaired by femme d’Etat Simone Veil), charged 
with advising the current French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, on the wisdom of 
inserting a “diversity” clause into the French constitution that would allow him to 
venture toward “positive discrimination,” recently rejected such a move resoundingly. 
The committee argued that the official recognition of race and ethnicity was a vestige 
of countries that had once practiced legal racial segregation.  In France, by contrast, 
it threatened to “weaken national unity” (affaiblissement du vivre-ensemble) and 
to foster group conflict.66  However, this defensive stance faces triple pressure by 
ethno-racial organizations, such as the Conseil représentative des associations noires 
(CRAN); by statisticians and demographers who ask for ethnicity-and race-sensitive 
measurements; and by corporations that push for “ethnic marketing” strategies and 
diversity as a tool to enhance their competitiveness.67  Above all, the French President 
himself has vowed to continue with his project of injecting more “diversity” into the 
government and top-level public functions: “I am not in favor of quotas, which make 
no sense.  But one can also not pretend that [a better representation of minorities in 
the French elites] will happen by itself, it will not happen by itself.”68  Interestingly, 
as the U.S. is increasingly questioning the wisdom of race-focused affirmative action, 
France, which had long prided itself on avoiding the Anglo-Saxon ways, is now 
cautiously, but steadily, moving in the American direction.
III. THE DECLINE OF MULTICULTURALISM AND THE RISE OF 
ANTIDISCRIMINATION
This leaves us with the startling fact that multiculturalism is in retreat, while 
antidiscrimination is on the rise.  This contrast is especially marked in Europe. 
Consider that the few European countries that had pursued official multiculturalism 
policies in the past have recently shifted to civic integration policies; at the same time, 
European Union law and domestic pressures have boosted antidiscrimination to an 
unprecedented degree.69  The ultimate source of the cooling down on multiculturalism 
66 SIMONE VEIL, COMITÉ DE RÉFLEXION SUR LE PREAMBULE DE LA CONSTITUTION : RAPPORT AU PRÉSIDENT 
DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE, Dec., 2008, at 57.
67 Cécilia Gabizon, La France dit non au fichage ethnique, LE FIGARO, Dec. 9, 2008, at 2.
68 Nicolas Sarkozy, quoted in id.
69 These developments are discussed in Joppke, Multicultural Citizenship, supra note 18; 
Christian Joppke, The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy, 55 BRIT. 
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is that liberal states are intrinsically geared “to treat people as individuals rather than 
as members of a class,”70 leaving the constitution of social groups to the individuals 
themselves.  This is the gist of universalistic citizenship that had once replaced the 
particularism of groups under feudalism.  At the same time, liberal states seek to 
rectify inequalities and injustices, driven by their commitment to equality.  This makes 
them favor antidiscrimination.  
However, the distinction between multiculturalism and antidiscrimination is not 
as neat as it appears.  This is because antidiscrimination tilts liberal states in the 
direction of group recognition that they philosophically abhor, forcing them to accept 
an unavoidable de facto multiculturalism.
Let us explore this paradox further.  The fact that discrimination and inequality 
often “follow cultural boundaries” makes liberal states captive to a “dilemma of 
recognition.”71  If they embark on “targeted redistribution policies,” examples for 
which are affirmative action in the U.S. or the positive discrimination that even 
France is poised to take, states cannot but engage in “definition, recognition, and 
even mobilization of the groups concerned,” which often accentuates the ethnic or 
racial distinctions that the policies seek to attenuate or even eradicate.72  As De Zwart 
argues, states have three possibilities to cope with the dilemma of recognition: They 
can “accommodate,” which is multiculturalism; they can “deny,” which is liberal 
color-blindness; or they can “replace” ethno-racial group distinctions with artificial 
proxy categories that avoid the freezing of ethno-racial distinctions that seems to be 
the drawback of accommodation.  As both multicultural accommodation and liberal 
denial apparently proved inadequate to redress discrimination and inequality, states 
are increasingly pushed toward replacement strategies.  Examples for replacement are 
the re-focusing of affirmative action from race to class, which is gaining ground in the 
U.S. or the use of geographic and socioeconomic proxies that France has long resorted 
to in her aversion to ethnicity and race (and now curiously finds insufficient), and 
which the Netherlands recently adopted in lieu of its old ethnic minorities’ policy.
However, De Zwart’s73 global review of replacement strategies finds them 
incapable of resolving the dilemma of recognition.  In the Netherlands, for instance, 
J. SOC. 237 (2004); Joppke, Transformation, supra note 64; and Christian Joppke, Beyond National 
Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe, 30 W. EUR. POL. 1 (2007).
70 Paul Starr, Social Categories and Claims in the Liberal State, in HOW CLASSIFICATION WORKS 
156 (Mary Douglas & David Hull eds., 1992).
71 Frank De Zwart, The Dilemma of Recognition: Administrative Categories and Cultural 
Diversity, 34 THEORY & SOC. 137, 142-144 (2005).
72 Id. at 137.
73 Id.
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the citizenship-focused “general policy” that replaced the group-focused “categorical 
policy” in the 1990s has foundered over the need to identify target populations for 
effective policy intervention.74  The Mayor of Amsterdam explained why subsidies for 
ethnic and subethnic “self-organizations” persisted despite the nominal withdrawal 
from them: “[W]e needed to contact society and in the process we as government … 
created the self-organizations ourselves, as it were”75 and the groups that emerged 
were exactly those that stood to be replaced!
By the same token, the modicum of group recognition that persists with 
antidiscrimination is pragmatic, not philosophical; it is recognition by default in 
the pursuit of effective remedies to discrimination, especially at local level.76  Such 
pragmatic recognition is a far cry from the principled “politics of recognition” decreed 
by Charles Taylor.77  Recognition proper does have its field of application, but it is 
much narrower drawn than propagated by the multiculturalists.  In fact, it closely 
overlaps with the politics of reparations, by means of which states have redressed 
historical injustice to particular groups.78  The mistake was to prolong this paradigm 
to immigrants.  Their very mobility has shown immigrants to be actors, not victims. 
And, as we have seen, they are actors with individual rights, which obliterate the 
group-focused program of multiculturalism.
CONCLUSION
This Article sharply contrasted multiculturalism and antidiscrimination as distinct 
ways of dispensing minority rights on immigrants.  Using Charles Taylor’s distinction 
between the politics of recognition and the politics of equal dignity, one could argue 
that multiculturalism follows the first, while antidiscrimination is part of the second.79 
The obvious riposte is that there is no clear distinction between the two, witness the 
author’s own claims about the group-making implications of antidiscrimination.  The 
American experience is indeed one where multiculturalism and antidiscrimination are 
74 See Frank De Zwart & Caelesta Poppelaars, Redistribution and Ethnic Diversity in the 
Netherlands: Accommodation, Denial and Replacement, 50 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 387 (2007).
75 Quoted in De Zwart, The Dilemma of Recognition, supra note 71, at 155.
76 See also Caelesta Poppelaars & Peter Scholten, Two Worlds Apart: The Divergence of National 
and Local Immigrant Integration Policies in the Netherlands, 40 ADMIN. & SOC. 335 (2008).
77 TAYLOR, MULTICULTURALISM, supra note 10.
78 JOHN TORPEY, MAKING WHOLE WHAT HAS BEEN SMASHED: ON REPARATIONS POLITICS (2005).
79 With customary lucidity, Steven Lukes has laid out this argument in a 1993 unpublished paper, 
“The Politics of Equal Dignity and the Politics of Recognition” (on file with the author).
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closely interlinked; the former providing the rationale for the latter’s turn from color-
blindness to color-consciousness.  More generally, multiculturalism, from Fanon on, is 
not conceivable outside of a context of discrimination, and, as Charles Taylor astutely 
pointed out, it thrives on a universalistic impulse of equality that it simultaneously 
undercuts.  So can one really locate multiculturalism and antidiscrimination on 
opposite ends of the particularism vs. universalism spectrum, as suggested here?
The fact remains that multiculturalism is in retreat, while antidiscrimination is 
going from strength to strength—a duality that, to repeat, is especially noticeable 
in Europe.  But, perhaps, multiculturalism’s retreat is in name only, and it is alive 
and kicking under the new label of “diversity.”80  This claim trivializes real policy 
change that has occurred in previous strongholds of official multiculturalism, most 
notably the Netherlands.  In fact, across liberal states there has been a new emphasis 
on binding immigrants into mainstream institutions and values instead of letting them 
drift apart in separate worlds.  For this stand the new policy of civic integration and 
the reinforcement of citizenship as main instrument and end-point of integration. 
Secondly, a facile equation of diversity with multiculturalism obscures the new 
diversity discourse’s subtle destruction of multiculturalism’s minority-majority 
dualism and restitutive justice orientation, so that “a farm boy from Idaho” figures no 
differently than a black ghetto kid on the front of “achieving … educational diversity 
[at] Harvard College,” to quote from Justice Powell’s famous opinion in the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s Bakke decision.81  Finally, the simple name-change claim sits oddly 
with the fact that “diversity” is elastic enough to have become a new management 
philosophy, in France no less than in the U.S.82
The frontier of research is to investigate more closely the group-making that 
still occurs as a result of effective antidiscrimination in this changed context, 
which is philosophically individualistic and anti-groupist, in some places (like the 
Netherlands) not-so-subtly nationalistic.  As suggested above, Europe is not poised to 
take the American road: a historical repeat of mutually reinforcing multiculturalism 
80 This is the claim made by Steven Vertovec & Susanne Wessendorf, Assessing the Backlash 
against Multiculturalism in Europe, MMG Working Paper 09-04, Max Planck Institute for the Study 
of Religious and Ethnic Diversity (2009).
81 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, supra note 44, at 316.
82 For the U.S., see Erin Kelly & Frank Dobbin, How Affirmative Action became Diversity 
Management, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 960 (1998) ; for France, see Laure Bereni, ‘Faire de la Diversité 
une Richesse pour l’Entreprise’: La Transformation d’une Contrainte Juridique en Catégorie 
Managériale, 35 RAISONS POLITIQUES 87 (2009).
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and antidiscrimination is not on offer.  In fact, the Veil report rejected a “diversity” 
commitment for the French state83 because of a differently textured, less urgent ethno-
racial situation in Europe.  But one must also consider that the American experience of 
state-level race formation has been critically monitored abroad.  If France, so far, has 
stayed away from ethnic statistics, from positive discrimination, and from replacing 
its socioeconomic and geographic proxy policies by an explicitly ethnic orientation, 
this is not only because of its own Republican aversion to intermediary groups, but 
also because there is no support for group-recognizing multiculturalism anywhere 
in Europe today.  A stronghold for the latter is still the local level, because of ethnic 
group entrenchment in urban areas with high immigrant density and a need of local 
governments for problem recognition and finding concrete addressees for effective 
policy intervention.  As Popelaars and Scholten show for the Netherlands, the result 
may be a radical divergence between national and local policy, national policy now 
being geared to the new civic integration and citizenship idiom, while local policy 
stays “multicultural,” if more for “pragmatic” than principled reasons.84
When assessing the evolution of minority rights for immigrants, which has been 
the focus of this Article, two qualifications have to be made.  First, the nucleus of 
immigrant rights is alien rights, not minority rights.  Alien rights accrue to immigrants 
qua immigrants, not qua ethnic group membership.  Rights of residence, work, 
welfare, and family reunion, one may reasonably argue, are what really matter to 
immigrants, and they are dispensed to them on the basis of legal immigrant status, 
irrespective of their ethnicity.  Under an individual-focused, global human rights 
regime, alien rights have significantly expanded after WWII, so much so that some 
authors have argued (prematurely in my view) that “citizenship” no longer mattered to 
immigrants.85  Alien rights, not minority rights, are the true theatre of rights expansion 
or contraction for immigrants.86  Second, with respect to minority rights, immigrants 
tap into a domain that has been historically carved out for other groups, most notably 
the descendants of African slaves in the U.S., and national minorities that have seen 
state borders move above their heads in Europe.  In the U.S., immigrants profited from 
83 VEIL, supra note 66.
84 Poppelaars & Scholten, supra note 76, at 348-50.
85 YASEMIN SOYSAL, LIMITS OF CITIZENSHIP (1994); DAVID JACOBSON, RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS 
(1996).
86 For rights expansion, see SOYSAL, supra note 85, and JACOBSON, supra note 85; see also 
Christian Joppke, The Legal-Domestic Sources of Immigrant Rights: The United States, Germany, 
and the European Union, 34 COMP. POL. STUD. 339 (2001).  For rights contraction, especially after 
2001, see CHRISTIAN JOPPKE, CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION 91-95 (2010).
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a historically thin citizenship construct and from the fact that “persons,” not “citizens,” 
are endowed with key constitutional rights, most notably that of equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  Immigrants’ inclusion in affirmative action privileges is 
due to this historical accident.  In Europe, there has been considerable resistance to 
including immigrants in existing minority policies, which had been devised for the 
historical victims of nation-state building, and for which international law stipulates 
the condition of citizenship in the rights-granting state.  This may be the reason for 
the shallowness of multiculturalism policies for immigrants in Europe, even at their 
historical peak. And note that the reversal of these policies for immigrants has never 
extended to their original beneficiaries, national minorities, for whom multicultural 
minority rights are as uncontested and firmly in place as ever.
Finally, the thrust of this article was conceptual, not empirical. It contrasted two 
modes of minority rights for immigrants, illustrating them with examples drawn from 
Europe and the U.S.  The next step would be a stricter cross-national or cross-regional 
comparison, which requires unfolding the many, often conflicting if not contradictory, 
national and sub-national, as well as cross-sectional, realities that had to remain hidden 
under the “Europe” versus “America” umbrellas.
